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Abstract 
 This thesis investigates the scope, magnitude and performance of zombie funds in the 
Nordic private equity market. Our sample comprises of a total 266 funds from the 5 different 
Nordic countries. The vintage years of our sample funds are from 1998 to 2007, in order to 
grasp the two major economic downturns since the turn of the millennia. We cross-examine 
our sample with funds that have a vintage between 2008 until today, in order to identify 
potential zombie funds. Given this analysis, we find that the zombie funds constitute a 
substantial proportion of the total Nordic PE market. We are also able to distinguish the 
performance between ‘normal’ and zombie funds. Due to the absence of adequate interim 
performance measurements, this thesis applies different exits as an indication of success. We 
find that zombie funds are less likely to exit their portfolio companies compared to normal 
funds. This is true across all PE-backed exit types in our analysis. We also find that zombie 
funds are more likely to occur for smaller funds.  
3 
 
  
 
Preface 
This thesis represents the end of a long and exciting period of research, and the end of a five-
year study of economics. Throughout the process, we have attained valuable knowledge 
about the private equity industry and gained new insight on how to conduct robust empirical 
research. The process has been challenging and time-consuming, yet very rewarding. 
There are several people, from whom we have received invaluable advice and assistance 
during this process. First, we would like to thank our supervisor, Associate Professor Tyler 
Hull. We truly appreciate your constructive and precise feedback throughout the thesis. 
Furthermore, we would like to thank Associate Professor Carsten Bienz for providing us with 
data on the Nordic private equity market, and for helping us with the fundraising related to 
the Preqin database. We would also like to thank Senior Investment Director at Argentum 
Private Equity, Espen Langeland, for sharing his industry knowledge with us.    
  
4 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................ 5 
2. RELATED LITERATURE ................................................................................................. 7 
3. PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS .............................................................................................. 9 
3.1 FUND STRUCTURE ........................................................................................................... 10 
3.2 COMPENSATION STRUCTURE ........................................................................................... 11 
4. ZOMBIE FUNDS ............................................................................................................... 13 
4.1 DEFINITION ..................................................................................................................... 13 
4.2 MECHANISMS .................................................................................................................. 13 
5. DATA, SAMPLE SELECTION AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY ................... 16 
5.1 SAMPLE SELECTION ........................................................................................................ 16 
5.2 VARIABLE DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................. 17 
5.3 IDENTIFICATION: ZOMBIE FUNDS .................................................................................... 18 
5.4 METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES ................................................................................. 19 
5.5 SUMMARY STATISTICS .................................................................................................... 20 
6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ................................................................................................. 21 
6.1 THE NORDIC ZOMBIE FUND LANDSCAPE ........................................................................ 21 
6.2 ZOMBIE FUND EXIT PERFORMANCE ................................................................................ 22 
6.2.1 IPO Exit Success ..................................................................................................... 22 
6.2.2 MBO Exit Success ................................................................................................... 22 
6.2.3 Trade Sale Exit Success .......................................................................................... 23 
6.2.4 Secondary Exit Success ........................................................................................... 23 
6.2.5 Other Exit Success .................................................................................................. 23 
6.2.6 Exit Fail .................................................................................................................. 24 
7. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 25 
8. REFERENCES ................................................................................................................... 27 
9. TABLES .............................................................................................................................. 29 
Table 1: Summary Statistics............................................................................................. 29 
Table 2: IPO Exit Success in Zombie Funds versus Normal Funds ................................ 30 
Table 3: MBO Exit Success in Zombie Funds versus Normal Funds .............................. 31 
Table 4: Trade Sale Exit Success in Zombie Funds versus Normal Funds ..................... 32 
Table 5: Secondary Exit Success in Zombie Funds versus Normal Funds ...................... 33 
Table 6: Other Exit Success in Zombie Funds versus Normal Funds ............................. 34 
Table 7: Exit Fail in Zombie Funds ................................................................................. 35 
10. FIGURES .......................................................................................................................... 36 
Figure A: Private Equity Fund Structure ........................................................................ 36 
Figure B: Zombie Fund versus Normal Fund Vintage Distribution................................ 36 
Figure C: Zombie-to-Normal Ratio ................................................................................. 37 
Figure D: Zombie Fund Aggregated Value ..................................................................... 37 
Figure E: Normal Fund Aggregated Value ..................................................................... 38 
Figure F: Zombie Fund Country Distribution ................................................................. 38 
Figure G: Zombie Funds by Fund Type .......................................................................... 39 
Figure H: Breakdown of Holding Periods for Private Equity-Backed Portfolio 
Companies by Year of Exit, 2006 - 2014 YTD. (Source Preqin) ..................................... 39 
5 
 
  
1. Introduction 
A 2013 article in The Economist sheds light on the dark shadows of the private equity 
industry, where conflicts of interest create situations in which there are no winners1. A 
special sub-category of funds roam these shadows, characterized by a wobbly walk towards 
an endless lifespan – here reigns the living dead. With an extended life, from which there is 
no comfortable escape, these funds are likely to return less than what was initially committed 
by the investors. The prospects of profits for the fund managers are equally grim, and their 
incentive to keep these funds alive is quite simply to collect management fees. Because of 
private equity’s remarkable barriers to exit, investors seem to suffer the biggest loss, but the 
fund managers also suffer great reputational damage, which makes it difficult to raise 
subsequent follow-on funds. Thus, in general, these funds are destroying value and inflicting 
trouble upon institutional investors, fund managers and portfolio companies alike. These 
frightening funds are undoubtedly undesirable for all the parties involved, and according to 
recent news articles and industry research, they are growing in numbers. Consequently, both 
the industry and the authorities has become acutely aware that there are zombies at the gates. 
 This subclass of private equity funds goes by many names, such as “disrupted cycle 
funds” or “tail-end funds”, but the term that has been adopted by the majority is “zombie 
funds”. There is limited empirical research on zombie funds, but recent interviews conducted 
by players in the industry show increased awareness related to zombie fund problems among 
institutional investors. In the summer of 2013, Preqin revealed that as much as 116 billion 
USD could be trapped in zombie funds globally, which surely has attracted interest from the 
authorities. Since then, both financial authorities in the U.K. and the U.S Securities and 
Exchange Commission have launched investigations of zombie funds2. However, despite 
increased awareness and rapid global growth in zombie funds, the private equity industry has 
thus far failed to find a long-lasting cure. Since the turn of the millennia, the world economy 
has been through two major economic downturns that have served as a fertilizer for zombie 
funds in both Europe and the U.S. A period with significant write-offs, followed by the credit 
crunch a few years later, has led to a sharp increase in zombie funds. Investors in need of 
liquidity and new post-Lehman Brothers capital adequacy rules for banks and insurance 
companies mean that many investors have increasingly pressured portfolios. This has 
                                                        
1 The Economist  “Zombies at the Gates” (March 2013) 
2 Reuters ”More than $100 billion trapped in 'zombie funds:' industry data” (June, 2013). & The Guardian: ” FCA inquiry into 'zombie 
funds' hits industry but may help millions of savers” (March, 2014)  
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amplified the ramifications of zombie funds and made an already sensitive industry even 
more prone to zombie fund situations.  
The majority of reports on zombie funds that provide descriptive statistics typically 
focus on the U.S. or Europe. This thesis focuses on zombie funds in the Nordic region. 
Specifically, we want to test if there is any significant empirical evidence that zombie funds 
are less likely to exit their portfolio companies compared other normal PE funds raised by 
Nordic GPs. Due to the absence of adequate interim performance ratios, we apply different 
exit types as a measurement of success for a PE fund in this thesis. 
Following the literature review in chapter 2, chapter 3 provides a conceptual 
clarification of the private equity fund structure. This chapter will elucidate the structural 
elements, which at least partly, facilitate the emergence of zombie funds. As academic 
research on zombie funds is limited at the time of writing, chapter 4 will provide a definition 
of zombie funds and an assessment on the mechanism of these funds. Chapter 5 covers data, 
sample selection and empirical methodology, while chapter 6 covers the empirical analysis. 
The empirical analysis uses a multivariate regression framework to test wheter zombie funds 
are less likely to exit their portfolio companies compared to normal PE funds. Finally, 
chapter 7 concludes the thesis.  
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2. Related Literature 
Zombie funds have indeed emerged as a widely conversed issue in the private equity 
industry and amongst private equity investors. However, the term “zombie fund” rarely 
features in the literature and empirical studies explicitly focusing on the zombie fund 
situation are scarce at best. In their paper on private equity performance, Phalippou and 
Gottschalg (2007) find that half of their sample funds report positive final net asset values 
(NAVs) despite the fact that the funds have reached their usual or maximum liquidation age 
and appear to be inactive. The paper states that the NAVs reported by these funds are likely 
to be worthless and thus represent “living dead” investments. Furthermore, Phalippou and 
Gottschalg conclude that these residual values ought to be written off, thus reducing private 
equity returns by 7 percent. This write-off resulted in a negative 3.5 percent private equity 
underperformance compared to public equity. Robinson and Sensoy (2012) looked at fee 
structure as a potential cause for GPs to delay liquidation of poor-performing funds. The 
paper suggests that funds with a change in fee basis from committed capital to net invested 
capital at some point during the fund’s life, tend to have LP distributions occurring later in 
the fund’s life compared to funds without such management fee provision. The idea that 
zombie fund managers struggle to raise follow-on funds is supported by the findings of 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005), which show that relatively poor performing funds are less likely 
raise a follow-on fund. Because returns in private equity take some time to realize, their paper 
suggest that when GPs raise the first follow-on fund, investors may not have learned 
completely about the true performance of the previous fund. This could indicate that zombie 
fund managers are able to raise a follow-on fund, but that the second follow-on fund is more 
difficult to raise. 
As mentioned in the introduction, a report from Preqin revealed that approximately 
1,200 private equity funds with an accumulated $116 billion worth of private equity assets, 
exhibits properties consistent with those of zombie funds3.  Furthermore, Preqin’s figures 
show that median distributions to paid-in capital are much lower for zombie funds compared 
to their peers, indicating that these are relatively poor performing funds. The majority of 
zombie funds are venture capital funds, but as much as $40 billion worth of net asset values 
are also trapped in buyout funds4. Although zombie funds appear to be absent in the literature, 
the private equity industry and its investors appear to be well aware of the situation. In a 
                                                        
3 Preqin, Private Equity Spotlight (June 2013).  
4 Preqin, Private Equity Spotlight (September 2013).  
8 
 
 
 
survey conducted by leading investor in the private equity secondary market, Coller Capital, 
57 percent of limited partners claim they have zombie funds in their portfolio and only 6 
percent believe they have predictable remedies to zombie fund situations in most cases5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 Coller Capital, Global Private Equity Barometer (Winter 2011-2012).  
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3. Private Equity Funds 
In contrast to investors in the public equity market, investors in the private equity 
market typically acquire interests in private equity investment funds rather than making direct 
investments in privately held companies. Although collective investment vehicles also exist 
in the public equity market, private equity investment funds differ significantly from both 
mutual funds and hedge funds, and possess certain characteristics that make these investment 
vehicles pre-eminently susceptible to zombie fund situations. Thus, a fundamental 
understanding of the structure of private equity funds is required in order to get a 
comprehensive grasp on why zombie fund situations arise in the private equity market.  
In generic terms, an investment fund is a joint investment scheme that uses a pool of 
capital from several investors to purchase financial securities collectively. Hence, the 
investment funds increase the investors’ financial ability to acquire securities. Holding an 
ownership stake in an investment fund yields the right to the underlying assets and associated 
income, but the investors are not involved in the everyday management of the fund, as each 
investment fund typically has a fund manager. Therefore, in addition to achieving greater 
purchasing power in the marketplace, the investors can capitalize on the expertise of a 
qualified asset manager. Investment banks and other asset managers, raise both investment 
funds aimed at retail investors such as mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and 
funds aimed at professional and institutional investors such as hedge funds. Consequently, 
the investment strategy of a specific investment fund can range from a low-cost fund tracking 
a broad stock market index like the S&P 500, to a fund with extensive use of financial 
leverage and derivative contracts.  
In the private equity market, private equity firms such as The Blackstone Group and 
The Carlyle Group raise investment funds in order to acquire multiple privately held 
companies, commonly referred to as portfolio companies. Private equity funds can also invest 
in publicly traded companies, with the intention of delisting the companies, i.e. turning them 
private. The principal property that sets private equity funds apart from mutual funds and 
hedge funds is the application of an active ownership structure to the portfolio companies. 
Through financial and operational improvements, private equity funds aim to enhance firm 
value, before eventually realizing profits through an IPO or by other means6. In fact, IPOs are 
a relatively small fraction of global private equity-backed exits, where the most common exit 
                                                        
6 Føllesdal, S. & Hagen, E.N. Private Equity-Backed Firms’ Performance Post IPO (2013). Norwegian School of Economics 
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routes are trade sales and secondary buyouts (SBOs)7. Private equity funds typically target 
professional and institutional investors such as insurance companies and pension funds, but 
also high net-worth individuals. The term “private equity fund” can be thought of as an 
umbrella term, beneath which we find investment funds with different strategies like venture 
capital funds (VC) and leveraged buyout funds (LBO). In addition to private equity funds that 
acquire portfolio companies, some funds known as fund-of-funds (FOF) purchase fund 
interests in other private equity funds rather than making direct investments in the underlying 
companies. Yet, despite numerous variations in investment strategy, the fund structure of 
most private equity funds tends to be analogous. Consequently, the following sections will 
examine the terms and structure of a generic private equity fund, henceforth abbreviated PE 
fund (Figure A). 
3.1 Fund Structure 
In terms of legal structure, a PE fund is typically set up as a limited partnership, in 
which the private equity firm serves as the general partner (GP) and several institutional 
investors serve as limited partners (LPs). Some PE funds are also organized as limited 
liability companies (LLCs), but dissimilarities in legal structure among PE funds primarily 
relate to tax considerations and regulatory issues8. PE funds exhibit certain properties that 
separate them from mutual funds and hedge funds. Firstly, GPs normally raise a fixed amount 
of capital, of which 1-5% is committed by the GP itself9. This means that the PE fund 
manager invest alongside the investors in the fund. The investors become LPs in the fund by 
subscribing for a capital commitment8. The capital commitments are not funded at inception, 
but rather through capital calls at the GP’s discretion. Thus, there is often a discrepancy 
between committed and invested capital at the fund’s disposal known as “dry powder”. 
Secondly, PE funds are limited duration investment vehicles, usually with a fixed 10-year 
lifespan, but with the option of annual or two-year extensions10. Finally, PE funds are closed-
end investment vehicles where a legally binding contract determines a limited period 
(typically 12-18 months), during which the fund can accept capital commitments. Therefore, 
beyond that specific period, new investors cannot buy into the fund and existing investors can 
neither add to their fund interest nor redeem their commitments8. The legal aspects related to 
the partnership are governed by the limited partnership agreement (LPA), which despite its 
                                                        
7 “Preqin Private Equity Spotlight”(July 2014). Preqin 
8 Naidech, S.W., Chadbourne & Parke LLP. Private Equity Fund Formation (2011). Practical Law Company.  
9 Gilligan, J. & Wright, M. Private Equity Demystified – An Explanatory Guide. Second Edition (2010).   
10 “Investor Hazzard: ‘Zombie Funds’” (2012). Wall Street Journal 
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name is a contractual obligation that binds both the GP and LPs. The LPA covers commercial 
issues like investment profile, profit sharing and fee structure, but also constitutional and 
administrative issues, e.g. when the fund manager can raise a new fund. 
The fund’s capital is invested during the first 3-5 years, after which the GP aims to 
raise a follow-up fund. Therefore, GPs often have more than one fund under management, 
and the success of the current fund is key to raising the next one. During the later years of the 
fund’s life, the investments are gradually exited and proceeds are usually distributed to LPs 
rather than being reinvested in the fund. Ultimately, as the fund approaches the end of the 
term, the fund is liquidated and any remaining proceeds are distributed to investors. Thus, the 
nature of private equity investments implies negative returns and cash flows in the early 
years, and investment gains and positive cash flows in later years11. This tendency is often 
referred to as the private equity J-curve. So, the LPs subscribe to a long-term illiquid capital 
commitment, from which they rely on the sale of the whole portfolio company to achieve a 
capital gain9, and from which they rely on the liquidation of the fund to get the commitment 
redeemed in full. 
3.2 Compensation Structure 
The prevailing fee structure in private equity is commonly referred to as the 2/20 rule, 
in which the GP receives 2 percent annual management fee and 20 percent carried interest. 
Therefore, the GP is essentially compensated in two ways; Firstly, the GP receives an annual 
management fee equivalent to 1-3 percent of the initial capital commited to the fund12. The 
management fee is applicable for the duration of the fund. However, as presented by Metrick 
and Yasuda (2007) in their paper on the economics of PE funds, a significant fraction of PE 
funds change the fee basis from committed capital to net invested capital after the completion 
of the investment period. Morover, about 50% of PE funds make adjustments to the post-
investment period fee level compared to the initial fee level, and some funds change both the 
fee basis and fee level. The management fee is intended to compensate the GP for operating 
the partnership and to cover the fund’s costs and expenses13.  
Secondly, a substantial fraction of the GP’s compensation is tied directly to the 
performance of the fund14. This performance fee is known as carried interest or simply as 
                                                        
11 Diller, C. Herger, I. & Wulff, M. The Private Equity J-Curve: Cash Flow Considerations from Primary and Secondary Points of View.  
Capital Dynamics.  
12 Prowse, S.D. The Economics of the Private Equity Market (1998). Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review.  
13 British Private Equity & Venture Capital Association (BVCA), Limited Partnership Agreement – Explanatory Notes (2002). 
14 Moon, J.J. Public vs. Private Equity (2006). Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Volume 18 Number 3.  
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“carry”, and is intended to reward the GP for enhancing performance. The carry is set as a 
fixed percentage (typically 20 percent) of profits that exceed comitted or invested capital. 
Generally, the carry is also conditional upon delivery of profits that exceed a specified hurdle 
rate or preferred return, which is measured as the funds internal rate of return (IRR). Some 
funds make carried interest payments annualy or at the end of the fund’s life, but the majority 
make payments at the sale of the investment, i.e. when the carried interest is generated15. 
Thus, It is common to see carry on a deal-by-deal basis, but also on a “whole fund” basis. 
According to Sahlman (1990), the carried interest may be several times larger than the 
management fees for a fund with average returns, which could lead to excessive risktaking 
from the GP in order to maximimize the carried interest. Other fees such as deal and monitor 
fees may also apply.  
                                                        
15 Preqin, the 2015 Preqin Private Equity Compensation and Employment Review.  
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4. Zombie Funds 
4.1 Definition 
Even though zombie funds have emerged from the shadows and created a lot of fuss 
in the private equity market, the term remains somewhat colloquial, and lacks a precise 
definition. Some even refuse to use to the term because of its pejorative nature, and one can 
argue that the perception of GPs on the matter differ greatly from that of the investors16. 
However, the two most important aspects to take into account is the fund’s duration and the 
GP’s ability to raise a subsequent follow-on fund. GPs aim to raise a new fund at the end of 
the investment period, which usually occurs 3-5 years after the commencement of the fund. 
In terms of duration, PE funds are limited duration funds with a fixed lifespan of 10 years 
plus a one or two-year extension. With regard to the categorization, one can apply strict or 
lenient conditions that must be satisfied in order for a PE fund to be categorized as a zombie 
fund.  
We apply a definition in which a fund can be categorized as a potential zombie fund if 
the fund manager has failed to raise a follow-on fund after 7 years. This definition conforms 
to the definition applied by Preqin when they identify zombie funds in their database17. Our 
analysis includes pre 2002 vintages, which means that a part of the sample selection also will 
conform to the strict definition of a zombie funds. A thorough elaboration of the 
identification of zombie funds in the Nordics is covered in chapter 5.  
4.2 Mechanisms 
Among different underlying dynamics, ranging from the industry’s lack of 
transparency to the fee structure in limited partnerships, underperformance sticks out as the 
major underlying factor18.  The GP’s incentive to keep an underperforming fund artificially 
alive at the expense of the LPs represents a misalignment of interests. As carried interest is 
off the table in a zombie fund, a term extension, which implies continued management – or 
rather lack of management – is the most lucrative option for the fund’s GP. If the GP think it 
is too early to liquidate the remaining assets and want to extend the fund’s life with a year in 
order to maximize the fund’s value, he is often in a position to do so according to the fund’s 
                                                        
16 “NewGlobe Capital Wants to Help ‘Disrupted Cycle’ Funds” (August 2013). Reuters PE Hub 
17 “Preqin Private Equity Spotlight” (June 2013). Preqin 
18 Many of the following issues are discussed in Migliorini (2014), who have conducted several interviews with LPs in order to uncover 
some of the underlying mechanisms of zombie funds. 
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terms19. In addition to charging management fees, GPs may also charge their own “consulting 
fee” in order to squeeze as much money out of the fund as possible. After the LPs have 
subscribed for a capital commitment, they have limited control over the investments made by 
the fund. The GP decides which portfolio companies to invest in, and when to exit the 
investments. When the fund’s maturity date is imminent, the future action may raise an 
internal conflict of interests between the LPs as well. Some investors may prefer immediate 
liquidity and are willing to record a loss when they think the fund is doomed, while other 
investors might prefer to hold on to the investment in hope for a brighter future.  
It would also be a reputational matter to keep a zombie fund alive. A GP’s business is 
strictly dependent on investor’s capital, and the willingness to reinvest their money in a 
successor fund. However, the LPs are mainly concerned about obtaining a good return on 
their committed capital, and are thus more attracted to choose a fund manager with a good 
track record. A GP that chooses to liquidate its zombie fund, e.g. with a fire sale, would in 
almost all cases have to disclose a bad performing fund on its record. This may appear as 
unappealing for future investors, which ultimately make them prefer a fund manager with 
better scores. Finally, the closing process can also provide some explanation as to why GPs 
rather want to keep a zombie fund alive20. In the U.K., there have been legislative changes 
that make it more expensive to close down a fund, which makes it easier for GPs 
economically justifiable to keep the fund alive, even when the performance is poor. There is 
no universal consensus to explain the mechanisms of keeping a zombie fund alive, even in a 
fund, which future prospects are poor.   
Several other contributing factors can lead to zombie fund situations. Funds that 
distribute a return below its benchmark need to convince the investors why they should sign 
up for a capital commitment in the follow-on fund. If the current fund underperforms, 
investors may opt to invest with a different GP. Another reason for not being able to raise a 
follow-on fund may be that LPs have lost faith in the fund manager. This issue is closely 
related to underperformance, but the loss in faith can also be tied to changes in the GP’s 
behavior, e.g. changes in the fund’s succession plan or to the risk profile. These changes may 
cause uncertainty and disbelief among the investors, and make them more reluctant to 
participate in a follow-on fund. A change in the investment team may also make the LPs 
                                                        
19 Belsley, M. & Charles, I.H. ”Phoenix rising – restructuring as a solution for zombie funds” (2013). Financier Worldwide 
20 ”Why is it so difficult to close down zombie funds?” (2014). Fundweb 
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more hesitant to invest in a follow-on fund, as the effectiveness of the initial investment team, 
whit whom they trusted their capital, can be adversely affected by such changes.  
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5. Data, Sample Selection and Empirical Methodology 
5.1 Sample Selection 
 The data is collected from Preqin’s database of PE funds in market, Fund managers 
and the performance analysis of the respective funds. The following fund types are excluded 
from our potential Zombie Fund’s analysis: Fund of funds, secondaries, distressed debt and 
co-investments. This is due to the nature of these funds, which will not meet our zombie 
fund’s definition criteria. The data is also restricted to only include Nordic funds. By this we 
mean funds where the GP’s headquarter is located in the Nordics. There are, however, no 
restrictions on the geographical investment focus for the corresponding funds. In addition to 
Preqin’s sample, we have also collected data from Argentum and SDC Thomson, in order to 
identify the number of exits and exit types for each fund. We have manually crosschecked 
these samples in order to identify the different exits nies in each fund.  
In order to identify potential zombie funds, the sample is based on one database that 
include Nordic funds with vintage year from 1998 to 2007, and another database that consists 
of Nordic funds with vintage from 2008 to 2014. The rationale for having a vintage year from 
1998 to 2007 is to cover both the dot-com bubble and the financial crisis, where we believe to 
find a higher concentration of zombie funds, consistent with our hypothesis. By cross-
referencing these databases, we are interested in finding GPs that only appears with funds 
from 1998 to 2007, and where the respective GP has not made any follow-up funds in the 
latter years. The sample is also controlled for GPs that are no longer active and has shut down 
its business. Funds that are liquidated are also excluded from our sample. 
 One of the biggest challenges in our sample is to find appropriate performance 
measurements that are applicable to the analysis. PE firms are not required to disclose 
performance data on its funds, which may create a bias in our sample21. Naturally, PE firms 
have incentives to disclose data on well-performing funds in order to attract potential 
investors. Conversely, PE firms would be more reluctant to unveil the same performance 
measurements on weak-performing funds. Thus, we use different exit types as a measure for 
a successful funds (e.g. IPO or trade sale), to prevent a violation of the random sampling 
assumption in the regression analysis. 
                                                        
21 Harris, R.S. Jenkinson, T. & Kaplan S.N. “Private Equity Performance: What Do We Know?”(2013). Journal of Finance 
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 Data regarding fund size, fund type and industry focus are all disclosed in our sample 
of potential zombie funds, and should not create the same possibility for biasedness. 
5.2 Variable Description 
 The analysis variable Vintage gives us the year in which the fund was raised. The 
vintage year can differ from the fundraising launch date, but the vintage year should provide 
a more realistic picture of the fund’s age. This is a crucial variable in identifying zombie 
funds in our dataset, due to the fact that we are interested in funds that have exceeded a 
certain age.  
The next analysis variable, potzf, is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the fund 
meets our predetermined criteria for a potential zombie fund. This dummy variable is zero 
when the criteria are not met.  
 The gploc variable tells us where the fund manager (GP) is headquartered. Only GPs 
with headquarters in the Nordics are included. To control for country specific effects, we 
have constructed a dummy variable (e.g. gploc1 for Denmark) for each country. 
 The analysis variable, zfexit, is a dummy that equals one when a Potential Zombie 
Fund has completed an exit, and zero elsewhere. The normalexit variable is a dummy that 
equals 1 when a ‘Normal’ Fund has completed an exit and zero elsewhere. 
We split the exit types into 6 categories and distinguish between the following exit 
types: IPO, MBO, Trade Sale, Secondary, Other and No Exits. We have counted each fund’s 
exits thoroughly, and made a dummy variable for each exit type, that equals 1 if the fund has 
the completed that particular exit type, and zero elsewhere. Other exits refer to unknown or 
special exit routes that could not be placed under one of the other categories. This could for 
example be restructurings or leveraged recapitalizations. Secondary exits refer to all types of 
exits through the secondary market. 
The crisis variable is a dummy that is meant to cover funds with vintage during any of 
the financial crisis. This variable equals 1 if the fund’s vintage is 2000, 2001 or 2007, and 
zero elsewhere. 
The domestic variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the fund has only invested in 
domestic companies, and zero elsewhere. This variable is constructed to test whether it is a 
relationship between domestic/foreign investments and the occurrence of Zombie Funds.  
18 
 
 
 
We do also want to control for fund size in our regression analysis. The small variable 
equals 1 for the lowest 50 percentiles of fund value, and zero elsewhere. 
5.3 Identification: Zombie Funds 
 During the past decade, the world’s economy has been through two major downturns, 
where both have had a great impact on the PE industry. Prior to the dot-com bubble, the 
amount of funds established peaked in 2000, being fueled by the growth the economy 
experienced on during that particular time. In 2000, PE firms raised $250 billion of new 
capital, with an outburst of new companies being invested in by venture capitalists22. The 
aftermath of the Internet bubble burst showed that the PE industry was severely hurt. Many 
of the portfolio companies were in the technology and communication industry, which were 
subject to heavy write-offs. Ultimately, the PE firms were left with funds that were extremely 
hard to liquidate. Instead of losing money on a fire sale or a costly restructuring, the GP 
would therefore have incentives to keep the funds alive and charging fees to LPs. 
 Through the financial crisis in 2008-2009, the PE industry experienced a similar 
downturn as under the dot-com bubble. In the lead-up to the financial crisis, the global 
private equity market reached new heights, and the PE firms were struggling to invest all the 
committed capital that was flowing in23. The overflow of cash drove the prices upwards, 
forcing the PE firms – in competition with each other – to pay overprices for the portfolio 
companies. However, when the crisis hit, the transaction volume fell ruthlessly, and funds 
started to struggle with underperformance and distressed companies in their portfolio24. The 
repercussion of the financial crisis reduced the available capital dramatically, making PE 
investments less attractive and harder to complete. The liquidity trap can be shown in Figure 
G, where the average holding period of a portfolio company has increased significantly since 
2008. This illustrate that GPs are now more often struggling to liquidate its assets as early as 
before.  
With the zombie fund definition in mind, it would be fair to assume that this type of 
funds would have a higher probability to occur when such crisis arises. This is the rationale to 
examine funds with a vintage as old as 1998, in order to grasp both of the economic 
downturns of the last decade. In dry markets, e.g. the post-financial crisis credit crunch, it is 
                                                        
22 “Private Equity: Past, Present and Future” (2003). Colombia Business School 
23 “Why Private Equity has Built up a Money Mountain” (January 2013). The Treasurer 
24 “Private Equity in the Wake of Economic Crisis” CDI Global  
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harder to liquidate the investments, especially with a decent return, making the funds more 
exposed to a zombie status.  
Thus, by examining funds with vintage from 1998 until today and look for those GPs 
that have yet to raise a follow-up fund 7 years after the commencement of the fund, we 
should be able to identify funds that can be placed in the potential zombie fund category. This 
category must of course be adjusted for liquidated funds, and for funds where the GP is not 
active anymore. Thus, we define Potential Zombie Fund (potzf) as a dummy variable that is 1 
if the examined fund meet our criteria mentioned above, and 0 otherwise. 
5.4 Methodology and Hypotheses 
 Our empirical analysis is separated into two main parts: In the first part, we want to 
identify zombie funds in the Nordic PE market. We do this by applying the investigation 
method described in the previous section, ‘Identification: Zombie Funds’. We do also 
examine different characteristics of the identified Zombie Funds, and compare them to 
‘Normal’ Funds. Among others, we look at the vintage and country distribution and at fund 
sizes. 
 In the second part of the empirical analysis, we apply a multivariate regression 
framework to test the probabilities of the occurrence of different exit types for a Zombie 
Fund versus a ‘Normal’ Fund. The investments in portfolio companies are realized through 
exits, and if the fund is unable to exit the portfolio companies, the investors do not get any 
distributions. Thus, due to the absent of other interim performance measurements, an exit can 
be seen as a success criteria for a PE fund. The exit types do naturally vary in return, but an 
empirical study shows that the return from the different exit types differ from year to year. 
There has not been any exit type that outperforms other during the last years25. We apply 
logit regression analyses in order to test the different exit type probabilities, and use different 
variables to control for the effects. We expect to observe that zombie funds are less likely to 
complete exits of its portfolio companies. This hypothesis relates to all of the exit types we 
are testing for, but we expect to observe that zombie funds are more likely to have portfolio 
companies that exits through the Secondary market or Other exit types (e.g. restructuring or 
leveraged recapitalization). Exits through Secondary market have been opted as a possible 
remedy for zombie fund situations. 
                                                        
25 Pitchbook and Grant Thornton.”Private Exits Report 2012 Annual Edition”. 
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 Ultimately, we test if zombie funds are more likely to have failed to exit the portfolio 
companies, by conducting a logit regression analysis. Our hypothesis on this particular issue 
is that a zombie fund is more reluctant to seek different exit routes, due to the incentive of 
charging management fees as mentioned earlier.  
5.5 Summary Statistics 
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sample applied in our analysis. Panel A 
shows that our sample consists of a total of 266 Nordic PE funds, and that we have examined 
940 exit transactions for these funds.  
As shown in Panel B, Finland has raised the highest number of funds during this 
period, with 31.6 percent of all the Nordic GPs located in Finland. Norway and Sweden 
follow Finland with 26.3 and 24.8 percent respectively. 16.2 percent of the Nordic funds are 
from Denmark, while Iceland is playing a minor part in the Nordic PE market. 
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6. Empirical Analysis 
6.1 The Nordic Zombie Fund Landscape 
By conducting the analysis process explained in the previous chapter, we identify in 
Figure B a total amount of 80 potential zombie funds in the Nordic private equity market. 
This constitutes 30.1 percent of all funds in our sample. We label them ‘potential’ due to the 
possibility of an abnormal strategic plan, e.g. an investment horizon that exceeds 7 years 
without raising any successor funds, or some other unforeseen factors. It is nevertheless a 
substantial amount of the Nordic PE market. 
Figure C provides support to the arguments presented in chapter 5.3. We observe two 
peaks with regard to zombie fund concentration around the economic downturns. The 
zombie-to-normal fund ratio peaked in 1999 (0.82), before the ratio experienced a sharp 
decrease the following years. The same tendency can be observed at the lead up to the 
financial crisis, where we can see a substantial increase in the zombie-to-normal fund ratio up 
to 2007 (0.50). Potential zombie funds with a vintage of 2008 cannot be observed until next 
year, when the “expiry date” for the next fundraising is due. But if it follows the same trend 
as under the dot-com bubble, we should expect a decrease in this ratio for the following years. 
Out of the 41.444 billion USD that has been raised by Nordic GPs between 1998 and 
2007, the total amount of money that is locked up in potential zombie funds is 4.365 billion 
USD. This means that 10.5 percent of the total amount being raised is located in a potential 
zombie fund. If we relate this percentage to the relative number of potential zombie funds 
identified in the first paragraph of 32.3 percent, we can draw a conclusion that potential 
zombie funds tend to be smaller than ‘normal’ funds. Figure D shows the aggregate fund 
value that has been raised by a zombie fund, while Figure E depicts the equivalent for a 
Normal Fund. 
Further, we find that the amount of potential zombie funds are evenly distributed 
between Finland, Norway and Sweden, with 27, 23 and 20 potential zombie funds 
respectively (Figure F). We only find 8 Danish potential sombie funds of a total of 43 funds, 
while Iceland is a minor player in the Nordic PE market. If we look at the concentration of 
potential zombie funds to normal funds, we find no country that stands out, other that Iceland, 
who has 2 potential zombie funds out of 3 funds in total that was established between 1998 
and 2007. 
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Out of the 940 examined exit transaction between 1998 and 2007, we find an 
increasing trend of using the secondary market as an exit route (Figure G). From 1998 to 
2007, the Secondary exit transactions have increased from 13 percent to 30 percent of the 
total exit volume. Exit through Trade Sales have been the most common strategy during the 
whole period, consisting of approximately half of the total exit volume. We also find a minor 
decrease in the IPO exit volume. 
6.2 Zombie Fund Exit Performance 
6.2.1 IPO Exit Success 
 We have applied a logit regression analysis in order to investigate the probability of 
an IPO exit in a Potential Zombie Fund versus a Normal Fund. The exit through an IPO will 
be a good indication of success and good performance, for both for the LP and the GP. An 
IPO would increase the possibility for a decent return to LPs and carried interest to GPs. 
Of the 70 IPOs from funds with a vintage between 1998 and 2007, we are only able 
identify 3 that have been completed by a Potential Zombie Fund in the Nordic PE market. 
This should be one of the reasons that the iposuccess is insignificant, as shown in Table 2. 
We observe a negative relationship between IPO Exit Success and Zombie Funds, but we 
cannot conclude that this relationship is statistically different from zero. We find a positive 
relationship between the two variables for ‘Normal’ Funds with a highly significant 
coefficient. 
Thus, we can conclude that the probability of an IPO is greater in a ‘normal’ fund 
than in a zombie fund. We do also find a significant and negative relationship for the small 
variable. This provide as a clear indication that larger funds is more likely to complete an exit 
for a normal fund, when controlling for the given variables in Table 2. 
6.2.2 MBO Exit Success 
 In Table 3, we change the main independent variable to mbosuccess, which indicates 
if a respective fund has completed an MBO Exit for one of its portfolio companies. Beside 
from that, the same variables as in the previous section are used. We can interpret the 
coefficients as probabilities. 
 The logit regression coefficients report insignificant outcomes for both zombie funds 
and Normal funds. We observe a positive relationship between a MBO Exit and both zombie 
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funds and normal funds. However, only the normal funds’ exits have a significant 
relationship. We also note the negative and highly significant relationship with the small 
variable. This means that larger normal funds are more likely to complete an exit transaction. 
Thus, we cannot conclude that a zombie fund is more prone or not to a MBO Exit. 
6.2.3 Trade Sale Exit Success 
 In Table 4 we find that Zombie Fund and Normal Fund are positively significant 
related to tradesuccess, by conducting a logit regression analysis, and applying the same 
control variables as in the previous section. Thus, we cannot conclude that a Normal Fund is 
more likely to have a Trade Sale of a portfolio company, than a Zombie Fund. We do also 
note that small is negative significant related to Normal Fund, and we can thus give the same 
interpretations as in the previous section. 
6.2.4 Secondary Exit Success 
 Table 5 reports the results from the logit regression when applying secsuccess as the 
main independent variable. We find a positive and significant relationship for a Normal Fund. 
The same coefficient for a Zombie Fund is insignificant, and we can therefore not conclude 
that the outcome is statistically different from zero. We do also observe a significant 
coefficient from the small variable on a Normal Fund, which is consistent with the findings in 
our previous regressions. 
  The Secondary market has been mentioned as a possible remedy for the Zombie Fund 
situation. But we do not find any supportive arguments for that in this regression. 
6.2.5 Other Exit Success 
 Table 6 provides us the results from the logit regression when otherexit is used as the 
main independent variable. As in the previous sections, we observe a significant coefficient 
for a Normal Fund, while we cannot conclude that the coefficient is different from zero for a 
Zombie Fund.  
 Other exits can be seen as alternative exit routes for the GPs, and is a variety of 
different methods. We are thus not putting to much effort into interpreting the outcomes from 
these coefficients. But we notice that a Normal Fund have a significant probability of 
completing an exit under these circumstances as well, while the Zombie Funds do not return 
any significant coefficients. 
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6.2.6 Exit Fail 
 Our last logit regression analysis has exitfail as the dependent variable. This dummy 
variable is equal to one when a fund has not managed to complete any exit transactions. The 
potzf dummy is the main independent variable in the regression. We do however also control 
for domestic investments, crisis vintage, fund size and GP’s location. 
 In this regression, we test the probability that a Zombie Fund fails to complete any 
exit transactions at all. We find a significant relationship between exitfail and potzf. This tells 
us that a Zombie Fund is more likely to not being able to exit its portfolio companies. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis that a Zombie Fund GP would be more reluctant to keep the 
fund artificially alive. This mainly due to the incentives of charging management fees, which 
is the main revenue source when the possibility of carried interest, is absent. 
 Further, we observe that the small variable is – to some extent – significant. Thus, we 
can also draw a vague conclusion that the possibility of an exit failure is higher in smaller 
funds. The other results do not report any significant coefficients. 
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7. Conclusion 
 This thesis identifies 80 Potential Zombie Funds in the Nordic PE market, which 
amounts to 4.365 billion USD worth of private equity assets. Out of the 266 private equity 
funds raised in the Nordics from 1998-2007, 30.1 percent are Potential Zombie Funds. In 
terms of vintage distribution, we observe two periods, during which there was a significant 
increase in zombie funds, the first being in the build-up to the internet bubble and the second 
being in the lead up to the financial crisis. Additionally, the zombie fund problem might 
stabilize or become better, as the post-financial crisis vintages reach maturity, if the 
repercussions follow the same pattern as during the dot-com bubble. The majority of the 
potential zombie funds identified in the analysis are VC funds, but also a significant amount 
is buyout funds. We also find that the Potential Zombie Funds are evenly distributed between 
Finland, Norway and Sweden, while Denmark and Iceland are minor players regarding to the 
amount of Zombie Funds raised between 1998 and 2007. 
 Our findings support the perception that zombie funds are a significant problem in the 
world of private equity and that they have increased in numbers. A zombie fund represents a 
situation in which there are no winners. There is a misalignment of interests between the fund 
manager and the investors, whereby LPs cannot realize their investments and GPs suffer 
great reputational damage. Thus, GPs find it difficult to raise follow-on funds and LPs cannot 
rebalance their portfolios. 
 Furthermore, the potential zombie funds are characterized by inferior performance 
and they tend to be smaller than normal funds. We do not find that the probability of an exit 
of a portfolio company from a Potential Zombie Fund is statistically different from zero. This 
applies for all exit types we tested for. We do however find a positive and significant 
relationship between a ‘Normal’ Fund and portfolio exits. We can thus say that a ‘Normal’ 
Fund is more likely to complete a portfolio company exit.  
 We do also find a significant relationship between fund size and Zombie Funds. Our 
analysis shows that smaller funds are more prone to be a Zombie Fund. We do not however 
find any significant relationships for the domestic and crisis variables. Thus, we cannot 
conclude that a Zombie Fund is more likely to being raised during economical crisis, or that a 
Zombie Fund is more likely to only invest in domestic companies. 
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 Our general conclusion is that Potential Zombie Funds are less likely to exit its 
portfolio companies compared to ‘Normal’ Funds. If exits are applied as an interim 
performance measure, we can say that Zombie Funds underperform other funds in the Nordic 
PE market. 
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9. Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N mean total 
    
noofexits 266 3.647 3.647 
secondary 266 0.692 0.692 
tradesale 266 1.654 1.654 
mbo 264 0.280 0.280 
ipo 265 0.264 0.264 
other 266 0.609 0.609 
potzf 267 0.599 0.599 
vintage 267 1,996 1,996 
small 237 0.464 0.464 
crisis 237 0.122 0.122 
dtype1 237 0.0211 0.0211 
dtype2 237 0.278 0.278 
dtype3 237 0.207 0.207 
dtype4 237 0.0380 0.0380 
zfexit 266 0.143 0.143 
normalexit 266 0.530 0.530 
    
Panel B 
ManagerCountry Freq. Percent Cum. 
Denmark 43 16.17 16.17 
Finland 84 31.58 47.74 
Iceland 3 1.13 48.87 
Norway 70 26.32 75.19 
Sweden 66 24.81 100.00 
Total 266 100.00  
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Table 2: IPO Exit Success in Zombie Funds versus Normal Funds 
This table reports the outcomes of the logit estimators using a successful exit dummy as the dependent 
variable. In Panel (1) the results is conditional of a zombie fund, while we use a ’normal’ fund in Panel (2). 
The dependent dummy variable equals one when a fund has managed to exit a portfolio company, and zero 
otherwise. The main independent variable here is iposuccess. This variable is equal to 1 if one of the exits 
in a portfolio is an IPO, and zero otherwise. All other independent variables are control variables described 
in Chapter 4. In parentheses the standard errors are corrected for heteroskadisticity by using robust 
standard errors. ***, ** and * represents statistical significance at respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(1)             (2) 
Zombie Fund      Normal Fund 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
iposuccess           -1.146           2.997*** 
(-1.56)          (4.14) 
 
domestic              0.897*         -0.583 
(2.12)         (-1.85) 
 
small                 0.552          -1.077*** 
(1.37)         (-3.34) 
 
crisis                0.560          -0.202 
(1.03)         (-0.43) 
 
gploc1               -0.794           0.384 
(-1.20)          (0.78) 
 
gploc2               -1.812**        0.0469 
(-2.98)          (0.11) 
 
gploc3                   0               0 
(.)             (.) 
 
gploc4               -0.167          -0.253 
(-0.35)         (-0.56) 
 
gploc5                   0               0 
(.)             (.) 
 
_cons                -1.754***        0.487 
(-4.11)          (1.47) 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
r2_p                  0.107           0.183 
chi2                  20.89           42.02 
N                       234             234 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3: MBO Exit Success in Zombie Funds versus Normal Funds 
This table reports the outcomes of the logit estimators using a successful exit dummy as the dependent 
variable. In Panel (1) the results is conditional of a zombie fund, while we use a ’normal’ fund in Panel (2). 
The dependent dummy variable equals one when a fund has managed to exit a portfolio company, and zero 
otherwise. The main independent variable here is mbosuccess. This variable is equal to 1 if one of the exits 
in a portfolio is a MBO, and zero otherwise. All other independent variables are control variables 
described in Chapter 4. In parentheses the standard errors are corrected for heteroskadisticity by using 
robust standard errors. ***, ** and * represents statistical significance at respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                (1)                    (2) 
       Zombie Fund      Normal Fund 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
mbosuccess           0.409           2.008*** 
                   (0.73)          (3.97)    
 
domestic              0.838*         -0.805*   
                     (2.03)         (-2.56)    
 
small                 0.685          -1.170*** 
                   (1.70)         (-3.85)    
 
crisis                0.481         -0.0929    
                   (0.92)         (-0.22)    
 
gploc1               -0.751           0.380    
                  (-1.14)          (0.79)    
 
gploc2               -1.809**        0.0802    
                  (-3.10)          (0.19)    
 
gploc3                   0               0    
                      (.)             (.)    
 
gploc4              -0.0668         -0.0465    
                  (-0.14)         (-0.11)    
 
gploc5                   0               0    
                      (.)             (.)    
 
_cons                -1.975***        0.627    
                  (-4.50)          (1.96)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2_p                 0.0962           0.142    
chi2                  17.26           37.15    
N                       234             234    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
Table 4: Trade Sale Exit Success in Zombie Funds versus Normal Funds 
This table reports the outcomes of the logit estimators using a successful exit dummy as the dependent 
variable. In Panel (1) the results is conditional of a zombie fund, while we use a ’normal’ fund in Panel (2). 
The dependent dummy variable equals one when a fund has managed to exit a portfolio company, and zero 
otherwise. The main independent variable here is tradesuccess. This variable is equal to 1 if one of the 
exits in a portfolio is a Trade Sale, and zero otherwise. All other independent variables are control 
variables described in Chapter 4. In parentheses the standard errors are corrected for heteroskadisticity by 
using robust standard errors. ***, ** and * represents statistical significance at respectively 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(1)             (2) 
Zombie Fund      Normal Fund 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
tradesuccess         1.463***        2.768*** 
                   (3.40)          (7.77)    
 
domestic              1.045*         -0.424    
                   (2.48)         (-1.19)    
 
small                 0.790          -1.175*** 
                   (1.87)         (-3.45)    
 
crisis                0.507          -0.321    
                   (0.92)         (-0.65)    
 
gploc1               -0.725           0.558    
                  (-1.08)          (0.95)    
 
gploc2               -1.506**         0.790    
                  (-2.61)          (1.63)    
 
gploc3                   0               0    
                      (.)             (.)    
 
gploc4                0.106          0.0982    
                   (0.22)          (0.19)    
 
gploc5                   0               0    
                      (.)             (.)    
 
_cons                -3.142***       -1.127*   
                  (-5.63)         (-2.46)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2_p                  0.153           0.323    
chi2                  26.84           72.80    
N                       234             234    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5: Secondary Exit Success in Zombie Funds versus Normal Funds 
This table reports the outcomes of the logit estimators using a successful exit dummy as the dependent 
variable. In Panel (1) the results is conditional of a zombie fund, while we use a ’normal’ fund in Panel (2). 
The dependent dummy variable equals one when a fund has managed to exit a portfolio company, and zero 
otherwise. The main independent variable here is secsuccess. This variable is equal to 1 if one of the exits 
in a portfolio is a Secondary Sale, and zero otherwise. All other independent variables are control variables 
described in Chapter 4. In parentheses the standard errors are corrected for heteroskadisticity by using 
robust standard errors. ***, ** and * represents statistical significance at respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels. 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(1)             (2) 
Zombie Fund      Normal Fund 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
secsuccess            -0.181           2.571*** 
                    (-0.40)          (6.29)    
 
domestic               0.856*         -0.517    
                   (2.06)         (-1.55)    
 
small                  0.627          -0.876**  
                   (1.57)         (-2.65)    
 
crisis                 0.481         -0.0711    
                   (0.91)         (-0.16)    
 
gploc1                -0.764           0.559    
                  (-1.17)          (1.10)    
 
gploc2                -1.781**       -0.0141    
                  (-2.98)         (-0.03)    
 
gploc3                     0               0    
                      (.)             (.)    
 
gploc4                -0.138          -0.235    
                  (-0.29)         (-0.49)    
 
gploc5                     0               0    
                      (.)             (.)    
 
_cons                 -1.835***      -0.0559    
                  (-3.91)         (-0.16)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2_p                  0.0947           0.255    
chi2                   16.17           51.98    
N                        234             234    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
 p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 6: Other Exit Success in Zombie Funds versus Normal Funds 
This table reports the outcomes of the logit estimators using a successful exit dummy as the dependent 
variable. In Panel (1) the results is conditional of a zombie fund, while we use a ’normal’ fund in Panel (2). 
The dependent dummy variable equals one when a fund has managed to exit a portfolio company, and zero 
otherwise. The main independent variable here is otherexit. This variable is equal to 1 if one of the exits in 
a portfolio is an Other Exit Transaction, and zero otherwise. All other independent variables are control 
variables described in Chapter 4. In parentheses the standard errors are corrected for heteroskadisticity by 
using robust standard errors. ***, ** and * represents statistical significance at respectively 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                      (1)             (2)    
                   Zombie Fund      Normal Fund 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
otherexit              0.649           1.862*** 
                     (1.57)          (4.84)    
 
domestic               0.894*         -0.603    
                   (2.11)         (-1.92)    
 
small                  0.679          -1.225*** 
                   (1.70)         (-3.76)    
 
crisis                 0.338          -0.577    
                   (0.64)         (-1.30)    
 
gploc1                -0.736           0.402    
                    (-1.14)          (0.77)    
 
gploc2                -1.731**         0.241    
                  (-2.94)          (0.56)    
 
gploc3                    0               0    
                      (.)             (.)    
 
gploc4                0.0164          0.0496    
                     (0.03)          (0.11)    
 
gploc5                    0               0    
                      (.)             (.)    
 
_cons                 -2.178***        0.260    
                  (-4.60)          (0.77)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
r2_p                   0.105           0.178    
chi2                   18.15           39.44    
N                        234             234    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 7: Exit Fail in Zombie Funds 
This table reports the outcomes of the logit estimators using an exit failure dummy as the dependent 
variable. The dependent dummy variable equals one when a fund has not managed to exit a portfolio 
company, and zero otherwise. The main independent variable here is potzf. This variable is equal to 1 if a 
fund is identified as a Potential Zombie Fund, and zero otherwise. All other independent variables are 
control variables described in Chapter 4. In parentheses the standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskadisticity by using robust standard errors. ***, ** and * represents statistical significance at 
respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. 
 
---------------------------- 
                      (1)    
                 Exit Fail    
---------------------------- 
potzf               0.982**  
                   (3.14)    
 
domestic           0.0340    
                   (0.11)    
 
small               0.738*   
                   (2.31)    
 
crisis             -0.352    
                  (-0.72)    
 
gploc1              0.348    
                   (0.68)    
 
gploc2              0.998*   
                   (2.48)    
 
gploc3                  0    
                      (.)    
 
gploc4              0.428    
                   (0.94)    
 
gploc5                  0    
                      (.)    
 
_cons              -1.874*** 
                  (-5.07)    
---------------------------- 
r2_p                0.104    
chi2                28.97    
N                     234    
---------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Figure A: Private Equity Fund Structure 
 
Figure B: Zombie Fund versus Normal Fund Vintage Distribution 
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Figure C: Zombie-to-Normal Ratio 
 
Figure D: Zombie Fund Aggregated Value 
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Figure E: Normal Fund Aggregated Value 
 
 
Figure F: Zombie Fund Country Distribution 
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Figure G: Zombie Funds by Fund Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure H: Breakdown of Holding Periods for Private Equity-Backed Portfolio 
Companies by Year of Exit, 2006 - 2014 YTD. (Source Preqin) 
 
 
